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"WHAT'S IN A NAME?"*: THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE AFTER ZAPATA CORP. V.
MALDONADO
Special litigation committees are groups of 'disinterested" directors assigned the
task of deciding whether a shareholder derivative suit is in a corporation's best inter-
ests. When a committee seeks to terminate derivative litigation determined not to be
in the corporation's best interests, courts are often called upon to review the decision.
This Note maintains that director decisions to terminate derivative suits must be
scrutinized like any other "business" decision by applying the traditional business
judgment rule. The Note concludes that, as in other contexts, the businessjudgment
rule should be viewed as a dynamic test, with courts manipulating burdens or stan-
dards ofproof to reach higher levels of scrutiny when indicia of director conflict of
interest or badfaith surface.
INTRODUCTION
SHAREHOLDER derivative suits traditionally have served the
business world as "corporate policemen."1 In form, a deriva-
tive suit is an action brought on behalf of the corporation by a
shareholder.' A problem arises, however, when the corporation
elects not to pursue the derivative litigation or seeks to dismiss it.3
* "That which we call a rose / By any other name would smell as sweet." W.
Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, act 2, sc. 2, line 43, in 1 THE PLAYS OF SHAKESPEARE 153,
174 (H. Staunton ed. 1858-61).
1. See Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 74, 77-82
(1967); see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Justice Jack-
son described the derivative suit's origin in Cohen:
Equity came to the relief of the stockholder, who had no standing to bring civil
action at law against faithless directors and managers. Equity, however, allowed
him to step into the corporation's shoes and to seek in its right the restitution he
could not demand in his own.... This remedy, born of stockholder helpless-
ness, was long the chief regulator of corporate management and has afforded no
small incentive to avoid at least grosser forms of betrayal of stockholders' inter-
ests. It is argued, and not without reason, that without it there would be little
practical check on such abuses.
337 U.S. at 548.
2. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534-35, 538-39 (1970); see also Comment, Offen-
sive Application of the Business Judgment Rule to Terminate Nonfrivolous Derivative Actions:
Should the Courts Guard the Guards?, 12 TEx. TECH. L. Rav. 636, 636-38 (1981) (share-
holder is nominal plaintifi corporation is real party in interest).
3. This usually occurs on a motion for summary judgment or a pretrial motion to
dismiss. Payson, Goldman & Inskip, After Maldonado-The Role of the Special Litigation
Committee in the Investigation and Dismissal of Derivative Suits, 37 Bus. LAW. 1199, 1209
(1982). But see Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (issues
presented when special litigation committee (SLC) seeks dismissal of shareholder deriva-
tive suit "are particulary inappropriate for summary disposition"). Under the Federal
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The resulting conflict is grounded in the dual nature of a deriva-
tive suit.4 A derivative suit consists of two segments: an initial
proceeding in equity5 compelling the directors to pursue the cor-
porate claim,6 followed by a proceeding seeking relief for the
corporation.
Rules of Civil Procedure, the corporation, as the moving party, must "show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that [it is] entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c). State rules contain similar standards. See, e.g., WEST'S ANN.
C.C.P. § 437(c); DEL. CT. C.P.R. 56(c); OHIO R. Civ. P. 56(C).
4. 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5946
(rev. perm. ed. 1980), states:
The cause of action when a stockholder sues is dual in composition, consisting
of the basic cause of action, which pertains to the corporation and on which it
might have sued, and the derivative cause of action, pertaining to the stockholder,
consisting in the fact that [the] corporation will not.. . sue for its own protection.
See also Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 452- 53 (1881) (stockholder "has two causes of
action entitling him to equitable relief... namely, one against his own company. . . for
refusing to do what he has requested them to do; and the other against the party which
contests the matter in controversy with that corporation"); Dent, The Power of Directors to
Terminate Shareholder Litigation" The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96,
99 (1980) (establishing dual nature of derivative suit in context of demand requirement);
Note, Judicially Exercised Business Judgments in Shareholder Derivative Suit Dismissals:
Implementing Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 46 ALB. L. REv. 980, 983 (1982) (same) [herein-
after cited as Note, Implementing Zapata]; Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative
Suits.4gainst Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 600, 603 (1980) ("derivative suit is, in effect,
two causes of action asserted by a shareholder"); Comment, The Demand and Standing
Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 168, 168 n.2 (1976)
(emphasizing that shareholders cannot sue in "personal capacity" for injury to corpora-
tion's asset pool, despite "pecuniary loss caused by a decline in the value of their stock").
5. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534-35, 538-39 (1970); see also Hawes v. Oak-
land, 104 U.S. 450, 452-53 (1881). It is important to recognize that by filing a derivative
suit a shareholder, either implicitly or explicitly, is suing the directors who decided against
pursuing the corporate claim. A challenge to such a decision must be viewed in the same
manner as any other "business" decision. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
6. Generally, a shareholder must satisfy very strict procedural requirements before
he will be permitted to pursue the derivative suit. See infra notes 55-66 and accompanying
text. The most significant hurdle is the demand requirement. An example of this require-
ment is set out in Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation... the corporation.., having failed to enforce
a right which may be properly asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and
shall allege. . . with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to ob-
tain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if neces-
sary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain
the action or for not making the effort.
FED. RULE CIV. P. 23.1. See generally Comment, supra note 4, at 169-82 (exhaustive re-
view of issues and collection of cases on demand requirement).
7. The underlying corporate claim may be for injuries caused by third parties or by
directors or officers. No distinction exists between injuries caused by either group of possi-
ble defendants. See 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 5850 (rev. perm. ed. 1980).
Most, if not all of the cases analyzed in this Note involve some form of director miscon-
duct. Some commentators have argued that corporate decisions not to pursue claims
against director defendants should be analyzed differently than other types of corporate
1983-841
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A significant controversy has developed within the conceptual
ambit of the proceeding to compel action on the corporate claim.
Corporations, desiring to "affect the path of litigation ostensibly
brought on [their] behalf,"8 conceived the concept of special litiga-
tion committees (SLC's). These groups of "disinterested" 9 direc-
tors are charged with determining whether the suit is in the
corporation's best interests. Two major cases, decided within a
relatively short time span,'0 have validated SLC's and circum-
scribed their powers. Burks v. Laskert and Zapata Corp. v. Mal-
donado 12 are both pivotal, yet somewhat elusive decisions in a
nascent area of corporate law. 3 These decisions have already
produced a substantial body of critical commentary. 4
decisions. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 4, at 110-34. The former situations, however, also
may be resolved through more traditional modes of analysis. See infra notes 24-39 and
accompanying text.
8. Aronoff & Freeman, Shareholder Derivative Actions-A Continuing Balancing Ef-
fort, Nat'l L. J., Nov. 16, 1981, at 28, col. 1.
9. The significance of the "interest" or "disinterest" of committee members is
grounded in the inherent judicial limitations on the business judgment rule. See infra notes
41-49 and accompanying text. Because one of those limitations is that "the directors mak-
ing the decision [not to sue] be independent--that they have nothing to gain or lose person-
ally as a result of the decision made," Note, Disinterested Director Committees and the
Shareholder Derivative Suit, 70 Ky. L.J. 831, 833 (1982), the use of SLC's with newly
appointed directors has proliferated. This has occurred because plaintiffs probably named
all of the preexisting directors as defendants. Although such procedural maneuvering can-
not, of its own accord, create "interest" in the litigation, Weiss v. Temporary Inv. Fund,
Inc., 516 F.Supp. 665, 672-73 (D. Del. 1981); see infra note 47 and accompanying text,
courts generally recognize that "where the directors, themselves, are subject to personal
liability in the action [they] cannot be expected to determine impartially whether [the suit]
is warranted." Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
10. When one considers that the Supreme Court recognized derivative suit principles
almost 130 years ago, see Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855), the rapid recog-
nition and proscription of SLC's between 1979 and 1981 is remarkable.
11. 441 U.S. 471 (1979); see infra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
12. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); see infra notes 121- 47 and accompanying text.
13. See supra note 10. Even the Zapata court "implicitly recognized that any answers
in this novel field of law must be partly provisional. . . in advance of the practical experi-
enceprovidedbyfuture cases." Payson, Goldman & Inskip, supra note 3, at 1212 (emphasis
added); see, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 891-92 (2d Cir. 1982) (attempting to establish
general guidelines for judicial scrutiny of SLC decisions because task is difficult and rule is
unclear), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983); Recent Development, 8 J. CoRP. L. 145, 165
(1982) ("As derivative litigation moved into the area of director malfeasance, the practice
of deferring the board recommendations for dismissal remained without adequate safe-
guards.") This Note seeks to highlight the "practical experience" provided by post-Zapata
decisons. See infra notes 148-81 and accompanying text.
14. See Block, Prussin & Wachtel, Dismissal of Derivative Actions Under the Business
Judgment Rule: Zapata One Year Later, 38 Bus. LAW. 401 (1983) [hereinafter cited as One
Year Later]; Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Ac-
tions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Viva Zapata?]; Coffee &
[Vol. 34:340
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This Note examines the "business judgment rule" in the con-
text 5 of corporate decisions to terminate derivative suits. It sug-
gests that far from being a novel "offensive"' 6 use of a "defensive"
rule, the use of the term "business judgment" often represents a
shorthand description of the differing degrees of judicial scrutiny
applied to a director's conformity with his performance obliga-
tions. 7 The Note first analyzes the "traditional" business judg-
ment rule'" and reveals its limitations as well as the reasoning that
underlaid its development.' 9 Second, the Note examines the cases
decided between Burks and Zapata.20 Third, it explores the post-
Zapata decisions, 2' establishing that each can be fully explained
by traditional business judgment analysis. The Note concludes
that future courts will, and should, continue to apply traditional
business judgment analysis to corporate decisions to terminate de-
rivative suits.22 The nature of previous court decisions and state
policies behind corporation statutes23 supports this conclusion.
I. THE TRADITIONAL BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
Courts use the term "business judgment rule" in a wide variety
Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposalfor Legislative
Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981); Dent, supra note 4; Comment, Off the Bench and
into the Boardroom: Judicial Busines Judgment After Zapata, 70 GEo. L.J. 1025 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Offthe Bench]; Comment, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado:
Restricting the Power of SpecialLitigation Committees to Terminate Derivative Suits, 68 VA.
L. REV. 1197 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Restricting the Power].
15. "In analyzing the application of the business judgment rule, the approach to judi-
cial review in one context ... may differ from that involved in another..... Veasey,
Seeking a Safe Harborfrom Judicial Scrutiny of Directors' Business Decisions-An Analyti-
cal Frameworkfor Litigation Strategy and Counselling Directors, 37 Bus. LAW. 1247, 1249
(1982). Veasey cogently posed several questions which need to be answered by the post-
Zapata decisions. These questions include: "Is there more than one standard of judicial
review? Is it feasible to articulate a cohesive statement of the business judgment rule so
that it will be applicable to various [types of "business" decisions]? Is [such a cohesive
statement] applicable to the termination of derivative suits upon motion of an [SLC]?" Id.
This Note answers each of these questions in the affirmative. See supra note 7; infra notes
24-49 and accompanying text.
16. Offensive in the sense that it may be used as a weapon to compel termination of
derivative suits. See Veasey, supra note 15, at 1260; Comment, supra note 2, at 653-59.
17. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 24-39 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 50-147 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 148-81 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
23. This Note focuses on the corporate statutory schemes of California, Delaware, and
Ohio, as well as that of the Model Business Corporation Act ("MBCA"). See infra notes 25
& 85 and accompanying text.
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of cases and factual patterns. What is often overlooked, however,
is the inherent congruence among the various applications of the
rule. The rule's underlying rationale, as well as its limitations,
permit its use in many seemingly divergent situations.
A. Rationalefor Its Development
Corporations may be engaged in several "asset projects" at
one time.24 While managing these ongoing projects, 25 corporate
directors must conform to judicially enforced performance obliga-
tions.26 The types of director decisions vary within the broad
range of permissible corporate transactions. All types of future-
looking27 decisions, grounded in the need for value maximiza-
24. Corporations have a wide latitude in carrying on their business. See, e.g., CAL.
CORP. CODE § 206 (West Supp. 1984) ("any corporation other than a corporation subject to
the Banking Law... may engage in any business"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b)
(1975) (corporations may "conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes"); OHIO
REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.03 (Page 1978) ("A corporation may be formed for any purpose or
purposes."); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 54(c) (1982) (corporations may be organized to
transact "any or all lawful business for which corporations may be incorporated").
25. State corporation statutes apparently favor centralized corporate governance. See,
e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 1977) ("business and affairs.., and all corporate
powers shall be exercised by or under the direction of the board") (emphasis added); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1982) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Page Supp. 1983) ("all the authority of a
corporation shall be exercised by or under the direction of its directors"); MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT § 35 1982) (normative description of such centralization).
26. "Directors and other officers must exercise the utmost good faith in all transac-
tions touching their duties to the corporation and its property. ... 3 W. FLETCHER,
supra note 4, § 850 (rev. perm. ed. 1975); see, e.g., United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125,
137-38 n. 11 (1972) (performance obligation includes acting with "good faith, and with an
eye single to the best interests of the corporation"); Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081,
1094 (10th Cir. 1972) ("directors and officers must manage corporate affairs in good faith
... and give the corporation the benefit of their best judgment and care").
In many states, this obligation to perform reasonably and single-mindedly in the best
interest of the corporation has been codified. The MBCA's version provides:
A director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of any committee of the board upon which he may serve, in good faith,
in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation,
and with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use
under similar circumstances.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 35 (1982). The codifications directly follow court decisions
predating the general corporation laws. See, e.g., Thomas v. Matthews, 94 Ohio St. 32, 113
N.E. 669 (1916) (directors must manage corporate business with view solely to common
interest, and cannot directly or indirectly derive personal profit or advantage because of
their position); In re Mansfield Ry., Light & Power Co., 3 Ohio App. 253 (1914) (stock-
holders of corporation are entitled to have corporation managed by directors whose sole
consideration is corporation's best interests.
27. "It is recognized that plans must often be made for a long future, for expected
competition, for continuing as well as an immediately profitable venture." Dodge v. Ford
[Vol. 34:340
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tion,28 involve "risk evaluation, assumption, or avoidance." 29
Several distinguished corporate law scholars have focused on
limited liability as the purpose of the business judgment rule.30
This analysis, however, approaches the business judgment rule's
underlying rationale from an improper perspective. Rather, this
judicially created rule is based on the wide latitude the courts
have given directors.31 The rule thus represents a summary of ju-
dicial decisions focusing largely on the appropriate level of scru-
tiny to be applied to director decisionmaking.
Judicial deference to the business decisions of corporate direc-
tors arose for several different but certainly related reasons. One
reason is that engrained in the equitable of doctrine "exhaustion
of remedies"32 is the goal of resolving corporate disputes within
the corporate structure.33 Another reason is that the business
Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 508, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919). A decision to seek dismissal of a
derivative suit should not be viewed differently, even though there may be some "structural
bias" in derivative suits alleging director misconduct. Structural bias, in contrast to the
actual bias of a particular director against a particular derivative suit, is a board of direc-
tors' inherent prejudice against any derivative suit. Note, Derivative Suits, supra note 4, at
601 n.14. One commentator has argued that courts often "display insensitivity" towards
structural bias. Id. at 601. This concern, however, can and indeed is being dealt with by
varying degrees of judicial scrutiny of directors' conformity with their performance obliga-
tions. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
28. Every business has one or more real asset projects aimed at maximizing the return
on the owners' investment. Some might suggest that decisions involving the pursuit of
corporate claims against third parties or directors differ in kind from other business deci-
sions since derivative plaintiffs bear the litigation costs. Yet, this should be just another
factor to consider, like any other cost or benefit, in a value-maximazation decision.
29. Veasey, supra note 15, at 1250.
30. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 4, at 135 (purpose of business judgment rule is to "insu-
late from liability directors who have made mistaken decisions resulting in corporate
losses, notwithstanding their good faith and exercise of due care"). But see Note, Deriva-
tive Suits, supra note 4, at 631 (business judgment rule's purpose is to "protect the board's
authority to manage the corporation, not to insulate directors from liability").
31. 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 1039, at 38 (rev. perm. ed. 1975).
32. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534, 538 (1970). See generally Com-
ment, supra note 4, at 169-91 (discussing demand requirement in derivative suits as reflec-
tion of exhaustion doctrine).
33. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 318 (1936); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450,
460-61 (1881); Galefv. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1980); cf. Lewis v. Graves, 701
F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1983). The Lewis court saw "numerous practical advantages" to the
demand requirement, thereby allowing corporations the opportunity to regain control of
derivative suits:
Corporate management may be in a better position to pursue alternative reme-
dies, resolving grievances without burdensome and expensive litigation. Defer-
ence to directors' judgments may also result in the termination of meritless
actions brought solely for their settlement or harassment value. Moreover, where
litigation is appropriate, the derivative corporation will often be in a better posi-
tion to bring or assume the suit because of superior financial resources and
knowledge of the challenged transactions.
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judgment rule represents judicial awareness of the statutory grant
of power to corporations34 and of the state policies supporting cor-
porate power. The final and most significant reason is that the
rule represents judicial cognizance of the uniqueness of business
decisionmaking.35 Judicial deference to the decisions of corporate
directors is not due to a belief that directors are blessed with a
special business acumen.36 Rather, it manifests the courts' recog-
nition of the realities of any ex ante decision. Such a decision,
based on a probabilities analysis, needs to be respected (absent
bad faith37 or conflict of interest 38) to foster proper and efficient
Id. at 247-48 (citations ommitted); see also Aronson v. Lewis, No. 203, slip op. at 11-12
(Del. Sup. Ct. March 1, 1984). InAronson, the court recognized that
[b]y its very nature the derivative action impinges on the managerial freedom of
directors. Hence, the demand requirement of Chancery Rule 23.1 exists at the
threshold, first to insure that a stockholder exhausts his intracorporate remedies,
and then to provide a safeguard against strike suits. Thus, by promoting this form
of alternate dispute resolution, rather than immediate recourse to litigation, the
demand requirement is a recognition of the fundamental precept that directors man-
age the business and affairs of corporations.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. See Comment, Off the Bench, supra note 14, at 1028 ("The rule manifests judicial
deference to the statutory grant of power to the board .. "); see also supra notes 24-25
(review of statutory schemes of California, Delaware, and Ohio).
35. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
36. Many decisions, however, seemed to base judicial deference on recognition of the
managerial expertise of directors. See Mills v. Esmark, 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1282 n.3 (N.D.
I11. 1982) (business judgment rule "reflects the reality that corporate decisions are better left
to those who are close to the facts and have the expertise to weigh the significance of those
facts in an increasingly complex business environment"); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d
619, 629-31, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000,419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-27 (1979) (courts respect director
decisions because statute vests responsibility in directors, who have necessary experience
and capabilities to discharge that responsibility); see also Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth,
Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980) (basing its reasoning onAuerbach). But see Galef v.
Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 57 n.13 (2d Cir. 1980) (because directors are given wide latitude,
they are not liable for honest errors made in good faith) (quoting 3A W. FLETCHER, supra
note 4, § 1039)(rev. perm. ed. 1975)).
37. Courts generally will not interfere with the decisions of directors acting within
their powers and in good faith. See, e.g., Cooper v. Central Alloy Steel Corp., 43 Ohio
App. 455, 183 N.E. 439 (1931); see also Goffv. Emde, 32 Ohio App. 216, 167 N.E. 699
(1928) (directors exercising reasonable care, diligence, and good faith not liable for losses
resulting from mere error ofjudgment). Indeed, some writers have argued that courts usu-
ally hold that bad faith precludes application of the business judgment rule altogether. See
Note, Implementing Zapata, supra note 4, at 984 n. 18 (citing Abbey v. Control Data Corp.,
603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47
N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979)).
Derivative plaintiffs, however, encounter a tough burden when proving bad
faith-they must face and surmount a double level presumption. First, directors are pre-
sumed to make their decisions in good faith. See, e.g., Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold
Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903); Treadway Companies v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357,
382 (2d Cir. 1980); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 56, 158 A.2d 136, 142 (1960). Second, if
good faith is presumed, directors also "enjoy apresumption of sound business judgment . . .
[Vol. 34:340
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corporate management.39
From the perspective of a court scrutinizing a director's con-
formance to his performance obligations, the focus must be on the
nature of the decisionmaking process, not on the competency of
the director.'
B. Limitations on Its Application
Corporate law authorities suggest that the business judgment
rule "yields to the rule of undivided loyalty. '41 Although this sug-
gestion is largely correct, the presence of dangerous temptations of
self-interest42 does not require a separate rule to determine a di-
rector's conformity with his performance obligation.
Judicial deference to decisions by a board of directors is based
which courts will not disturb if any rational business purpose can be attributed to their
decisions." Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1194 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (em-
phasis added), af'd, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). But see
Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, [Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,704
(6th Cir. Mar. 2, 1984). In Hasan, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment. The focus of the Sixth Circuit's disagreement was the district court's
use of the good faith presumption. Judge Jones wrote that "[n]either the Auerbach nor
Zapata approach allows a reviewing court to extend members of a special litigation com-
mittee the presumption of good faith and disinterestedness." Id. at 97,824.
38. "Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion intra vires the corporation, ex-
cept where the directors... stand in a dual relation which prevents an unprejudiced exer-
cise of judgment .. " United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S.
261, 263-64 (1917); see also Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir.
1974) (courts avoid intervention when director decisions not influenced by personal consid-
erations); Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A.2d 952, 956 (Del. Ch. 1980) (appropriate busi-
ness decision presumed absent facts showing some taint of conflict of interest); Goff v.
Emde, 32 Ohio App. 216, 221, 167 N.E. 699, 701 (1928) (directors not liable where they
have not personally profited from their acts). To avoid conflict of interest problems in the
context of a derivative suit, corporations devised the SLC. See infra text accompanying
notes 68-70.
39. The business judgment rule "provides directors with the discretion they need in
formulating dynamic and effective company policy without fear of judicial second guessing
... [as well as] encourag[es] competent individuals to assume directorships." Viva
Zapata?, supra note 14, at 32; see also Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259,
274 (3d Cir. 1978) ("The rationale for the rule is that in order for the corporation to be
managed properly and efficiently, directors must be given wide latitude in their handling of
corporate affairs."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
40. See Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980).
41. 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 1039, at 38 (rev. perm. ed. 1975).
42. See, eg.,In re Ryan's Will, 291 N.Y. 376,406, 52 N.E.2d 909, 923 (1943). Several
writers have noted inherent director bias in the context of a corporation seeking termina-
tion of a derivative suit. See Dent, supra note 4, at 113 ("[B]oth inside and outside direc-
tors are discouraged from independence by pressures to conform. . . [which become] more
onerous when [they] are asked to subject a fellow director to a suit that could lead to a
major financial liability, loss of job, and public humiliation."); see also text accompanying
notes 63-66 & 87-91 (dicussing conflict of interest in the context of derivative suits).
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on a presumption that the decisions were honest, unbiased, and in
compliance with fiduciary obligations.43 The business judgment
rule bars substantive review of board decisions as long as the pre-
sumption remains intact. 4 The rule does not, however, irrevoca-
bly shield directors' decisions from challenge. Rather, "the
business judgment rule extends only as far as the reasons which
justify its existence."45
The general level of judicial deference to board decisions de-
creases as indicia of conflict of interest or bad faith begin to sur-
face.' To overcome the rule's presumptions, and thus challenge a
board decision directly, a derivative plaintiff must first show facts
which, if true, would remove the decision from absolute protec-
tion.47 The plaintiff thus has the initial burden of demonstrating
the presence of bad faith or conflict of interest.4 Heightened judi-
cial scrutiny of a director's performance will not be applied if this
burden is not met.49
The level of scrutiny exercised by a court must be viewed
along a continuum-rigid tests are not applied. Although the per-
formance obligation of directors stays constant, courts nonetheless
manipulate the other parts of the judicial review equation to reach
a higher degree of scrutiny. For instance, a court may shift the
burden of establishing good faith from one party to the other (an
increased procedural burden). Or a court may demand a stronger
showing of credible evidence on one or several issues (an in-
creased substantive burden). The business judgment rule, there-
fore, must be viewed as a dynamic rather than a static test.
43. See, e.g., Evans v. Armour & Co., 241 F. Supp. 705, 713 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (interpret-
ing Pennsylvania law and finding that business judgment rule presupposes good faith
board decisions); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (presumption
of sound business judgment); Prince v. Bensinger, 244 A.2d 89, 94 (Del. Ch. 1968) (direc-
tors presumed to have acted in good faith); Marblehead Bank Co. v. Raridon, 4 Ohio App.
468 (1915); cf. supra note 37 (derivative plaintiffs must overcome two tiered presumption of
good faith and sound business judgment to prove directors' bad faith).
44. Comment, supra note 2, at 639; see Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631, 393
N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-27 (1979).
45. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983).
46. See Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative
Suit, 73 HARV. L. REv. 746, 753-54 (1960) (discussing conflict of interest as determinant of
whether demand requirement excused); infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
47. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980).
48. Id.
49. See supra note 37.
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C. Applicability to Shareholder Derivative Suits
Eighty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized that if a
board has the requisite power, a decision on whether to litigate a
corporate claim is a management prerogative.50 Fourteen years
later, in United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper
Co. , ' Justice Brandeis emphasized:
Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts
a cause of action for damages is, like other business questions,
ordinarily a matter of internal management and is left to the
discretion of the directors .... Courts interfere seldom to con-
trol such discretion ... except where the directors are guilty of
misconduct ... or... stand in a dual relation which prevents
an unprejudiced exercise of judgment .... 52
A director deciding whether to litigate a corporate claim en-
counters risks and confronts uncertainty, as he does when making
any other business decision.53 Accordingly, a decision not to pur-
sue a corporate claim should be subject to the business judgment
rule.
The derivative suit's dual nature54 brings the business judg-
ment issue to the forefront at the time the shareholder seeks to
litigate the corporate claim. A "demand" on the board is usually
required prior to filing suit,55 because the shareholder is seeking to
enforce a corporate rather than a personal claim.5 6 The subse-
quently filed derivative suit conventionally alleges, in addition to
50. See Corbus v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903) (di-
rectors may consider expense of litigation or furtherance of corporation's general business
in determining whether to enforce corporate claim); see also Comment, supra note 4, at 196
& n.179 (directors should consider "likelihood of success" of litigation, "direct and indirect
costs," and possible "impairment of friendly commercial relations").
51. 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
52. Id. at 263-64 (emphasis added).
53. See, e.g., Veasey, supra note 15, at 1250.
54. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 6; see also Comment, supra note 4, at 171 (demand requirement
gives board opportunity to exercise management authority by taking control of litigation).
See generally 13 W. FLETCHER, su/pra note 4, § 5963, at 398-99 (rev. perm. ed. 1980) (re-
viewing case law on general rule of demand on directors). In addition to requiring demand
on the board of directors, some states require that demand also be made on the other
shareholders. See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1881) (shareholder must show, if
unable to get board action, "that he had made an honest effort to obtain action by the
stockholders as a body"); Wolgin v. Simon, 722 F.2d 389, 392 (8th Cir. 1983) (interpreting
Missouri law, Mo. R. Cw. P. 52.09, and finding that demand on all shareholders is re-
quired even if it "would have taken too long and cost too much"); Comment, supra note 4,
at 182 (showing that many states have adopted requirement of demand on shareholders)
(citing Apiz. R. Crv. P. 23.1; MINN. R. Civ. P. 23.06).
56. See supra notes 2 & 4-7 and accompanying text.
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the existence of a corporate claim, that the board wrongfully re-
fused to prosecute the claim.57 This allegation in the share-
holder's complaint can be viewed, implicitly, as a separate cause
of action, 8 triggering the business judgment rule. The board's de-
cision not to litigate or seek dismissal of a corporate claim should
be scrutinized according to the same dynamic analysis as that used
to evaluate other business decisions.59
Applying the business judgment rule to a -board's refusal to
maintain the suit must not be confused with the demand require-
ment.60 Demand is a requirement that shareholders exhaust intra-
corporate remedies before going to court with a derivative suit6
and is generally strictly enforced.62
Demand on a board and its wrongful refusal are not always
57. See, e.g., 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, §§ 5954, 5961, 5963-70 (rev. perm. ed.
1980) ("the right to sue arises from the fact that the corporation itself refuses to sue," id.
§ 5954, and such refusal, express or implied, is condition precedent to derivative suit, id.
§ 5961); see also Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 534-35 (1970) (corporate refusal to pro-
ceed after suitable demand is precondition for derivative suit).
58. Comment, Off the Bench, supra note 14, at 1032 n.41 (suggesting that this analysis
is helpful "for the purpose of understanding the application of the business judgment rule"
where demand is made and refused).
59. The application of different tests to termination decisions ignores the underlying
rationale for the business judgment rule's development and the rule's inherent flexibility.
See supra notes 24-39 and accompanying text. Such an approach would only breed
confusion.
60. See, e.g., Grossman v. Johnson, 674 F.2d 115 (1st Cir. 1982).
61. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text; see also Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d
1157, 1162 n.6 (lst. Cir. 1977) (purpose of demand is to "require resort to the body legally
charged with conduct of the company's affairs before licensing suit in the company's name
by persons not so charged") (emphasis added); In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479
F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir. 1973) ("to be allowed, sua sponte, to place himself in charge without
first affording the directors the opportunity to occupy their normal status, a shareholder
must show that his case is exceptional") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857
(1973).
62. See, e.g., Evangelist v. Fidelity Management & Research Co., 554 F. Supp. 87, 90
(D. Mass. 1982) (demand requirement is to be strictly enforced and excused "only in excep-
tional circumstances"); Roderick v. Canton Hog Ranch Co., 46 Ohio App. 475, 479-80, 189
N.E. 669, 671 (1933) (stockholder may not maintain suit without alleging prior demand on
corporation, unless demand would have been futile). But cf. Daily Income Fund v. Fox,
104 S. Ct. 831 (1984). In Fox, the Supreme Court held that Rule 23.1's demand require-
ment did not apply to a security holder bringing suit under § 36(b) of the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (1982). The Court had found that § 36(b) did not
confer a right judicially enforceable by the investment company. This forced the Court to
address the meaning of Rule 23.1's language and requirements:
[H]owever desirable the encouragement of intracorporate remedies may be as
matter of policy, it is not, standing alone, enough to make a suit that the corpora-
tion can neither initiate nor terminate a "derivative action" within the meaning of
Rule 23.1. Such a suit does not come within the Rule's language as it is most
naturally interpreted and as we have consistently understood it.
104 S. Ct. at 837 n.9.
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prerequisites for initiating a derivative suit. Demand may be "ex-
cused" if the court determines that such a requirement, because of
director "interest," would have been useless.6 3 Trial courts deter-
mining a director's level of "interest" in the litigation have consid-
erable discretion to excuse the demand requirement.' Courts
typically have excused demand when, for example, a majority of
directors are named as defendants, and thus have a clear adverse
interest, or when a board clearly indicates that it would refuse de-
mand. 5 Some courts have suggested that different standards of
director "interestedness" should apply depending on whether no
demand was made or whether demand was made and refused.6
A number of recent cases, however, espouse a significantly broad-
ened interpretation of the demand requirement.67
63. 13 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 5965 (rev. perm. ed. 1980); see, e.g., Brody v.
Chemical Bank, 482 F.2d 1111, 1114 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (demand on directors not re-
quired where it would be useless), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1104 (1973); Sorin v. Shahmoon
Indus., 36 Misc. 2d 35, 38, 231 N.Y.S.2d 956, 959 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (same).
64. See Fields v. Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co., 454 F.2d 682, 684-85 (7th Cir. 1971) (court
has discretion to excuse demand requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1);
deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 1970) (same).
65. See Nussbacher v. Continental IlL Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 518 F.2d 873, 878-79
(7th Cir. 1975) (allowing suit to proceed without prior demand because defendants domi-
nated board), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976); cf. Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp.,
582 F.2d 259, 276 (3d Cir. 1978) (plaintiffs failed to establish that defendants so dominated
board as to make demand futile), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979).
66. See, eg., Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1980) (standard when no
demand had been made is whether it would have been futile to have tried, whereas when
demand was made and refused, standard is whether directors were disinterested enough to
have been unprejudicial).
67. See, e.g., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1983) ("absent specific alle-
gations of self-dealing or bias on the part of a majority of the board, mere approval and
acquiescence are insufficient to render the demand futile."). Following Lewis, there now
exists a severe dislocation (at least from the derivative plaintiffs point of view) between the
demand requirement and judicial review of board (or SLC) decisions not to pursue deriva-
tive actions. Lewis, when read in conjunction with Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025
(2d Cir. 1982), creates a significant if not insurmountable barrier to review of the merits of
a derivative plaintiff's case. Abramowitz requires a court, in a demand-required case, to
"defer to the company's business judgment to forego litigation unless the shareholder can
show that the directors acted wrongfully [in refusing plaintiff's demand]." Id. at 1031.
This deferential standard is extremely difficult for a derivative plaintiff to satisfy. See supra
note 37. Because Lewis has broadened the class of demand-required cases, Abramowitz's
deferential review of director decisions will be activated more frequently. While a broad
demand requirement boasts certain benefits, see supra note 33 and accompanying text, the
policy of permitting shareholders to redress wrongs done to the corporation is undercut by
requiring demand in such a wide class of cases and at the same time giving extreme defer-
ence to board decisions not to sue.
But see Aronson v. Lewis, No. 203, Slip op. at 20-21 (Del. Sup. Ct. March 1, 1984)
(plaintiff must "alleg[e] facts with particularity which, taken as true, support a reasonable
doubt that the challenged transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business judg-
ment" (emphasis added)). The court in.4ronson was responding to the lower court opin-
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II. BURKS TO ZAPATA." VALIDATION AND CIRCUMSCRIPTION
Corporate defendants conceived the concept of special litiga-
tion committee (SLC) to avoid problems of interestedness.68 To
deal with suits identifying a majority of directors as wrongdoers,
boards have delegated their statutorily granted authority69 to
SLC's to decide whether the corporation should pursue the
claim.7" In 1979, the Supreme Court, in Burks v. Lasker,71 estab-
lished a two-part test to determine whether disinterested directors,
whether or not comprising an SLC, could properly terminate
shareholder derivative suits.
A. Burks v. Lasker
Prior to Burks, lower federal courts had faced several cases
involving SLC's seeking to terminate shareholder derivative
suits.7" In Gall v. Exxon Corp. ,3 for example, a shareholder de-
rivative suit sought reimbursement for the corporation from those
ion which utilized a "reasonable inference" standard. Id. at 18. Although somewhat
stricter, the "reasonable doubt" standard will not pose an insurmountable barrier. This is
particularly so in cases which involve director self-dealing. It is clear from Aronson, that
absent such particularized charges, the protections of the business judgment rule's pre-
sumptions are still operative. The Delaware Supreme Court properly recognized that
courts have become too lenient in excusing demand. They were mindful, however, "that
the plaintiff need only allege specific facts; he need not plead evidence." Id. at 23. If
derivative plaintiffs meet this simple, but particularized requirement, thereby excusing de-
mand, the review standard of Zapata will be activated in a significant number of cases.
68. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. Simply naming a director as a de-
fendant is not necessarily enough to create interest in the litigation. See supra note 9; see
also Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 633, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920,
928 (1979) (to so limit independence "would be to render the corporation powerless to
make an effective business judgment with respect to prosecution of the derivative suit").
But see Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242, 1243-44 (D. Minn. 1978) (direc-
tor properly named as defendant is necessarily "interested"), aft'd, 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
69. See supra notes 24-25 & infra note 85.
70. But see Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983)
(directors "who are parties to the derivative action may not confer upon a special commit-
tee... the power to bind the corporation as to its conduct of the litigation").
71. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
72. See, e.g., Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Minn. 1978), a]/'d,
603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); cf. Galef v. Alexander, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 96,758 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1979) (termination decision by disinterested direc-
tors who constituted majority of board but did not comprise SLC), rev'd, 615 F.2d 51 (2d
Cir. 1980).
73. 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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who had allegedly made improper foreign payments.74
An independent committee 75 had found that the suit would
not have been in the corporation's best interests. The court held
that absent some taint of conflict of interest or "allegations that
the business judgment exercised was grossly unsound, the court
should not at the instigation of a single shareholder interfere with
the judgment of the corporate officers." '76
Federal courts have created a potential conflict with policies
embedded in existing federal law by sanctioning use of the busi-
ness judgment rule to scrutinize directors' decisions.77 As a result
of the rule's presumptions, director decisions are less open to at-
tack. Derivative actions, however, often represent the only effec-
tive method of enforcing violations of federal statutes.78 With
applicable federal statutory policy in view, the Burks Court
sought to establish the proper standard for determining the availa-
bility of board or SLC dismissal.
The Court held that in determining the propriety of dismissing
a derivative suit under the Investment Company Act of 194079
and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940,80 the initial inquiry is
whether the termination is permitted under applicable state law.,
The second inquiry is whether the state law is consistent with fed-
74. Id. at 509. Between 1963 and 1974, $59 million of corporate funds had been used
as contributions to Italian political parties and as bribes to others.
75. The committee was composed of three disinterested directors. Two were nonem-
ployee (outside) directors. The third was an Exxon senior vice president who had just left a
post with the United States Treasury Department. None of the committee members was
elected to the board until after the questioned payments had been made. Id. For an inter-
esting discussion of how to choose independent directors to serve on SLC's, see Payson,
Goldman & Inskip, supra note 3, at 1201-04.
76. 418 F. Supp. at 516.
77. This conflict does not arise when federal courts face the same issues in diversity
cases. Cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts sitting in diversity
must apply state law).
78. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432- 33 (1964) (implied private right of
action is available under § 14(a) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1982), as means of supplementing SEC's enforcement powers). For a discussion of the
federal policies embodied in J Case and how they impact on derivative suits, see Coffee
& Schwartz, supra note 14, at 287-300.
79. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1982).
80. Id. §§ 80b-I to -20 (1982).
81. 441 U.S. at 475-80. Neither the Investment Company Act nor the Investment
Advisors Act requires that federal law, rather than state law, control the authority of direc-
tors, because the relevant federal policies do not demand that directors' powers be uniform
among the states. Id. at 479 & n.6.
Despite the second part of the Burks test, which focuses on whether the state rule is
compatible with federal policy, a real question arises whether, in the post-Burks decisions,
the federal policy embodied in .. L Case is being subverted by state law.
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eral policy.8 2 Most of the controversy seems to have centered on
the stage of determining what state law permits or limits, which is
when the courts have confronted the business judgment rule.83
The Burks decision, like the traditional rule, requires the
board or SLC to have the power to act under state law.84 Since
most corporate statutes authorize a broad delegation of board
powers to committees, 85 an SLC's statutory authority is seldom at
issue.86
Another judicial concern is the possibility of conflicts of inter-
est impinging on an SLC's ability to act independently.87 Some
courts, though, have held that a committee is independent when
the plaintiff merely failed to allege sufficient evidence to the con-
trary.88 At the other extreme, at least one court has doubted even
the possibility of a corporate board creating an unbiased commit-
tee.89 Cases involving the traditional disinterested business judg-
ment defense, however, do provide some specific themes for
determining whether a committee is truly unbiased. Courts have
applied heightened scrutiny to director decisionmaking when the
82. 441 U.S. at 480.
83. See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1145 (1982); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869
(1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1017 (1980). But see Evangelist v. Fidelity Management & Research Co., 554 F. Supp. 87
(D. Mass. 1982) (court denied power of termination because federal policy behind Invest-
ment Company Act overrides power to seek termination under state law).
84. 441 U.S. at 480.
85. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 311 (West 1977) ("Any such committee [appointed
by the board] ... shall have all the authority of the board .... ); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 141(c) (1975) (such committees "shall have and may exercise all the powers and authority
of the board of directors in the management of the business and affairs of the corpora-
tion"); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.63(a)-(f) (Page Supp. 1983) (directors "may authorize
the delegation to any such committee of any of the authority of the directors . . . [and]
an[y] act or authorization of an act by any such committee. . . shall be as effective. . . as
the act or authorization of the directors"); MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 42 (1982) (com-
mittees appointed by board "shall have and may exercise all the authority of the board of
directors").
86. The issue has not been dispositive in any of the recent cases. See cases citedsupra
note 83.
87. See supra notes 10 & 69-74 and accompanying text. But cf. Coffee & Schwartz,
supra note 14, at 283 (not enough attention is given to problem of structural bias in board
determinations); Dent, supra note 4, at 110-17 (same); Note, Derivative Suits, supra note 4,
at 629 (same).
88. See, e.g., Rosengarten v. International TeL & Tel. Corp. 466 F. Supp. 817, 825
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
89. See Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Tex. 1980). But see
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 633, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002. 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928
(1979) ("To accept [such] assertions... would be to render the corporation powerless to
make an effective business judgment with respect to prosecution of the derivative action.").
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director or his family had a financial interest adverse to that of the
corporation,90 or when the director had authorized and/or
benefitted from the underlying challenged transaction.91
Despite these concerns, various federal courts, with direction
from the Supreme Court concerning the proper choice of law,
"hastened to bless"92 SLC termination decisions. These cases
fall into two general categories-suits alleging that directors or of-
ficers had made or authorized illegal foreign payments,94 and suits
alleging that they had' breached their fiduciary duty and violated
federal securities laws.95
B. SLC Dismissals of Derivative Suits Alleging Improper
Foreign Payments
Many have sought reimbursement from directors or officers
for improper payments made on the corporation's behalf. Courts
traditionally have upheld payments made in this context.9 6 InAb-
bey v. Control Data Corp. , shareholders brought a derivative ac-
tion against seven directors seeking repayment of civil and
criminal penalties charged to the corporation.9" The Eighth Cir-
cuit, following the Supreme Court's Burks test, interpreted Dela-
ware law to determine whether the SLC could terminate the
derivative action.99 The court affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Control Data, stating: "As a matter
of Delaware law,. . . the [business judgment] rule applies to any
reasonable good faith determination by an [SLC] that the deriva-
tive action is not in the best interests of the corporation."00
Some writers have criticized the Abbey decision for relying on
cases involving true business decisions to determine the board's
90. See Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 681 (Del. Ch. 1969).
91. See Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1980).
92. Aronoff & Freeman, supra note 8, at 28, col. 3.
93. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 83; see also Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F. Supp.
120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (interpreting Delaware law), aft'd, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982); Mal-
donado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (interpreting Delaware law), rev'd in
part, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam); infra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 96-109 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
96. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 271.
97. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
98. The corporation had pled guilty to making illegal foreign payments between 1967
and 1976. As a result, almost $1.4 million in civil and criminal penalties were levied
against and paid by the corporation. Id. at 726.
99. Id. at 728.
100. Id. at 730.
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authority to delegate its powers to the SLC. 10 A decision not to
pursue a corporate claim, however, even when arising against di-
rectors or officers, is a business decision and the power to make
the decision may be delegated to an SLC. 0 2
An SLC had also recommended terminating a shareholder de-
rivative suit in Auerbach v. Bennett,10 3 in which the suit charged
that four of General Telephone & Electronics Corporation's direc-
tors and its accounting firm were liable for approximately $11 mil-
lion paid by the corporation in bribes and kickbacks. The New
York Court of Appeals, with a very broad application of tradi-
tional business judgment analysis,"°4 limited its inquiry to the in-
dependence of SLC members and the adequacy of their
procedures. 10 5 The rule's presumptions, which serve to protect
any business judgment, were operative in this case. 1°6 The major-
ity held that courts "must and properly should respect the board's
determination"' 10 7 once satisfied with its independence and meth-
odology because courts are "ill-equipped"'1 8 to evalute ex ante
business decisions. The court, recognizing the impact of conflict
of interest on judicial review of SLC decisions, did leave open the
possibility that summary judgment may be withheld until broader
discovery has been afforded a shareholder seeking specifics con-
101. See, e.g., Note, Derivative Suits, supra note 4, at 618 (delegating authority to SLC's
"is readily distinguishable from delegating authority to a committee for the purpose of
approving transactions between the corporation and a majority of directors"). Although
these two situations may be distinguishable, the dynamic traditional business judgment
rule should still apply. See supra notes 27-28 & 59 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
103. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
104. The court stated that all corporate actions "taken in good faith and in the exercise
of honest judgment" deserve protection. Id. at 629, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at
926.
105. Id. at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419 N.Y.2d at 927.
106. The court found that "[n]otwithstanding the vigorous and imaginative hypothesiz-
ing and innuendo of counsel there [was] nothing in [the] record to raise a triable issue of
fact as to the independence and disinterested status of [the SLC]." Id. at 632, 393 N.E.2d at
1001, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927. So even under the test set forth in what is arguably the most
proshareholder decision of recent years, Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch.
1980), the derivative plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
107. 47 N.Y.2d at 631, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
108. Id. at 630, 393 N.E.2d at 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 926. This degree of scrutiny of a
board's decision to terminate a derivative suit is essentially the traditional test which ap-
plies to any business decision. See supra notes 24- 49 and accompanying text; see also
Veasey, supra note 15, at 1262 (deference to the SLC determination "translates into the
same refusal to review directors' decisions as is the case in the [traditional]. . . application
of the business judgment rule").
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cerning an SLC's disinterestedness.'0 9
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Conflict of Interest-Increased
Scrutiny of Corporate Decisions to Terminate Derivative
Litigation
In Lewis v. Anderson,'1° an SLC sought dismissal of a suit by
minority shareholders against Walt Disney Productions and a ma-
jority of its board for violating federal securities laws1 1 in connec-
tion with grants of stock options." 2  With no controlling
California decision, the Ninth Circuit applied what it believed to
be the relevant state law." 3 Following a quick review of the tradi-
tional business judgment rule and its application to SLC termina-
tion decisions," 4 the court noted that the relevant California
statutes were "almost identical" 15 to those of Delaware. This sim-
ilarity enabled the court to rely heavily on the Abbey decision,
which had interpreted Delaware law." 6 That decision, as well as
Auerbach, were seen by the Lewis court as "reflecting a clear trend
in corporate law."' 17
109. 47 N.Y.2d at 636, 393 N.E.2d at 1004,419 N.Y.S.2d at 930; see also Rosengarten v.
International Tel. & Tel. Co., 466 F. Supp. 817, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stay of summary
judgment until there could be discovery of SLC members was granted "[o]ut of concern for
the interest of shareholders in probing the motivation, good faith, and thoroughness of
minority directors").
110. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
111. The plaintiff asserted two claims based on alleged securities law violations. The
first claim under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982),
alleged that the directors had inside information concerning the price of Disney stock
which enabled them to issue options at a price that would ensure profits. The second claim,
brought under § 14(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982), alleged that proxy statements
sent to shareholders lacked full disclosure of the stock option plan. Id. at 783 n.2. See
generally Block & Barton, The Business Judgment Rule as Applied to Stockholder Proxy
Deripative Suits Under the Securities Exchange Act, 8 SEc. REG. L. J. 99, 106-10 (1980)
(discussing federal securities law policies in context of derivative suit termination).
112. In November 1974, the corporation's "stock option committee" granted the de-
fendant directors new options which allegedly were more favorable and in violation of
federal securities laws. 615 F.2d at 780.
113. This is the first step of the Burks test. See supra text accompanying note 81. The
Ninth Circuit also addressed the second step, see supra text accompanying note 82, finding
no federal policy conflicting with the state law authorizing termination of the derivative
suit. 615 F.2d at 783-84.
114. Id. at 781-82.
115. Id. at 782; see supra notes 25 & 85.
116. 615 F.2d at 782. The Ninth Circuit's reliance on Abbey must be reexamined in
light of Zapata. See infra notes 121-47 and accompanying text. While theAbbey court's
interpretation of Delaware law may still be valid in the context of illegal foreign payments,
the strong conflict of interest overtones in Lewis indicate that the case falls within the
Zapata zone of heightened judical scrutiny.
117. 615 F.2d at 783 (emphasis added).
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There are two ways to approach the "clear trend" language in
Lewis. First, the Ninth Circuit could have been focusing on the
results in the cases' 18 that had granted summary judgment to cor-
porations or their SLC's seeking termination of derivative suits. " 9
Second, and the better view of the trend, is that it represents an
application of traditional business judgment rule concepts to ter-
mination decisions.
In its application of the business judgment rule, the Lewis
court felt it necessary to analyze closely the facts surrounding the
termination decision. This increased scrutiny was due to the
court's concern over the possibility of director interest. The cor-
poration's appointment of an SLC, however, enabled the court to
give business judgment protection to the decision.' 20
D. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado
1. Facts and Procedural Complexities
The lawsuit, originally Aaldonado v. Flynn,121 was based upon
allegations of director self- dealing.1 22 In 1979, the Zapata board
formed an "independent investigative committee" consisting of
two newly appointed outside directors. The committee decided
that Maldonado's suit in the Delaware Chancery Court, as well as
related suits in two federal district courts, were against the corpo-
ration's best interests and consequently recommended dismis-
sal.' 23  In January of 1980, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted Zapata's motion for summary judg-
118. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 83 & 93.
119. In fact, there have been virtually no cases in which an SLC has recommended suit
after a shareholder demand. See Dent, supra note 4, at 109 n.70.
120. 615 F.2d at 783. But see Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y.
483, 489, 121 N.E. 378, 379-80 (1918) (Judge Cardozo noted that "[a] dominating influence
may be exerted in other ways than by a vote .... ); see also Coffee & Schwartz, supra
note 14, at 283 & n.124 (discussing reasons for domination of outside directors by corporate
executives).
121. 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980).
122. In 1970, a stock option plan adopted by Zapata's board granted certain officers
and directors options to purchase common stock at $12.15 per share. The plan, to have
been exercised in five installments, was to terminate on July 14, 1974. As that date drew
near, the company planned to announce a tender offer for 2.3 million of its own shares,
which would increase the price per share to about $25. If the options were exercised before
the final date, the company would have lost a significant tax advantage while the directors
would have received corresponding tax benefits. For this reason, Zapata's directors voted
to accelerate the final option date to July 2, 1974, six days before the announcement of the
tender offer. In 1975, Maldonado brought a derivative suit alleging that the directors had
breached their fiduciary duty. Id. at 1254-55.
123. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 781 (Del. 1981).
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ment. t24 Shortly thereafter, the Delaware Chancery Court, fol-
lowed by the District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
reached the opposite result and denied Zapata's motion. 125 Vary-
ing interpretations of Delaware law, particularly the conffict be-
tween the chancery court and federal courts applying Delaware
law, spurred the Delaware Supreme Court to resolve the question
of an SLC's authority to terminate a derivative suit.'2 6
2. The Decision
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the chancery court's
holding that a shareholder has an independent right to prosecute a
derivative suit. 27 The court acknowledged that a Delaware cor-
poration's board has the power to delegate its authority, despite
the taint of self-interest of a majority of its members.128  Going
further, though, the court added an arguably new step to the busi-
ness judgment rule analysis. On remand, the chancery court was
instructed to "apply its own independent business judgment ' 129 in
scrutinizing the committee's decision to seek summary
judgment.130
3. Apparent Sign4fcance
A literal reading of Zapata suggests that it might well be lim-
ited to suits in which demand on directors is excused.' 3 1 Several
124. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 285-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 671 F.2d
729 (2d Cir. 1982) (remanding for district court review of Zapata criteria since district
court's decision interpreting Delaware law was reached before Delaware Supreme Court's
decision).
125. See Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348, 352-53 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Maldo-
nado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d at 1262.
126. 430 A.2d at 781.
127. Id. at 782.
128. Id. at 786.
129. 430 A.2d at 789.
130. The court, believing that it was "striking the balance between legitimate corporate
claims as expressed in a derivative stockholder suit and a corporation's best interests as
expressed by an [SLC]," stated that this step shared "some of the same spirit and
philosphy" as the chancery court decision. Id. at 789 & n. 18 "'Under our system of law,
courts and not litigants should decide the merits of litigation."' Id. (quoting Maldonado v.
Flynn, 413 A.2d at 1263).
131. In a footnote, the court appeared to draw a distinction between derivative suits
that have been properly initiated and those in which no demand had been made:
[WMhen stockholders, after making demand and having their suit rejected, attack
the board's decision as improper, the board's decision falls under the "business
judgment" rule and will be respected if the requirements of the rule are met. ...
That situation should be distinguished from the instant case, where demand was
not made, and thepower of the board to seek a dismissal, due to disqualification,
presents a threshold issue.
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writers, however, believe that the distinction between when de-
mand is required and when it is excused should not be dispositive
of the level of judicial scrutiny. 132 Despite these views, several
post-Zapata decisions have focused on this dichotomy. 3 3  The
distinction, in effect, places the burden of proving lack of good
faith and independence on the shareholder when demand is re-
quired, but not when it is excused. The burden of proof is on the
shareholder in demand required cases because of the presumption
of good faith inherent in the traditional business judgment rule. 134
Thus, when demand is required, the Zapata test scrutinizes a cor-
poration's refusal decision as it would any business decision.
When demand is excused, however, the burden of proving
good faith and independence is shifted to the corporation.135 This
result can best be explained as a sub silentio 136 shifting of the con-
formity test'37 by the Zapata court. Sensing a high degree of self-
interest, the court required the corporation to meet the usual stan-
dard for summary judgment.'38 It is as if the normally operative
Id. at 784 n.10 (emphasis in orginal).
132. See, e.g., Dent, supra note 4, at 105-07; cf. One Year Later, supra note 14, at 414
(recommending "making demand mandatory in all cases and fusing into one procedure the
board's consideration of the demand with the motion to terminate"). But see Galef v.
Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1980) (suggesting that there necessarily may be differ-
ent standards for judicial scrutiny of these two separable parts of derivative suit process).
Although these writers do not advocate the traditional mode of analysis, see supra notes
24-39 and accompanying text, the result they urge inevitably would amount to just that.
133. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 671 F.2d 729, 731 (2d Cir. 1982) ("We note only
that the court drew a sharp distinction between cases in which demand is made on the
corporation to sue on its own behalf and those in which such demand is excused due to
futility."); Stein v. Bailey, 531 F. Supp. 684, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (when demand not ex-
cused, courts should only ask whether SLC's decision not to sue was wrongful); Watts v.
Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311, 1326 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (seeing Zapata
as four-pronged test, with first prong being whether suit was properly initiated). But see
Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1283 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1982) ("Although the Zapata
opinion does distinguish between demand and non-demand cases, we hesitate to draw the
bright line advocated by the Second Circuit. . . . [D]emand on the board, although cer-
tainly relevant to the level of. . . review, does not itself bar all such review in this Court
under Delaware law.") (emphasis in original).
134. See supra note 37; see also Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoF-
STRA L. REv. 93, 130-33 (1979) (examining good faith presumption and strength of evi-
dence needed in particular situations to overcome it).
135. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788. Despite this shift in burden, the court still recognized the
power of a corporation to seek dismissal through an SLC. Id.
136. See, e.g., Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 14, at 270 (in cases where "the challenged
transaction contains aspects of self-dealing, the court will sub silentio impose a higher stan-
dard of judicial review, even though the directors themselves were not dominated or con-
trolled by the defendants." (emphasis added)).
137. See supra text following note 49.
138. See supra note 3.
DYNAMIC BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
presumptions were negated by the factors which had led to excus-
ing demand.
In addition to shifting the burden of proof, the court explicitly
indicated that the trial court, in its discretion, should exercise a
"second step."' 3 9 This second step implicitly changed the sub-
stance of the conformity test. The step involved the trial court's
exercise of its own business judgment as to whether the action
should proceed. Those who suggest that the corporation's burden
of proof under the step will not be "particularly high" 140 are, in a
sense, correct.
The content of the business judgment rule was subtly recast
under Zapata to require the SLC to "show that its reasons for
seeking termination are not only defensible, but persuasive."' 141
The Delaware Supreme Court explicitly advised the trial court to
take account of "matters of law and public policy in addition to
the corporation's best interests."1 42  Superficially, the court ap-
peared to be "interposing. . .a completely new two-step test."'143
The two-step test, however, may be explained by traditional anal-
ysis. 44 The court seems merely to have explicated a bifurcated
analysis which most courts have exercised "under one guise or an-
other, . . . whether [admitted] or not." 145
The Delaware Supreme Court's opinion demonstrated to other
courts that judicial candor may represent the preferable approach
to the many novel and difficult questions raised by corporate at-
tempts to terminate derivative litigation. Despite the candor of the
Zapata decision, many questions remain unanswered'n 6 -the
139. 430 A.2d at 789. There is real dispute over whether this second step is indeed
discretionary. See, e.g., Comment, Restricting the Power, supra note 14, at 1215 (future
courts "generally will proceed to the second phase of the Zapata test"); see also Joy v.
North, 692 F.2d 880, 897-99 (2d Cir. 1982) (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority
for making second step of Zapata mandatory), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983).
140. See, e.g., Comment, Restricting the Power, supra note 14, at 1214. The burden will
not significantly increase because the second step merely explicates the analysis used in
prior decisions. It is not a new burden in the sense of changing the normal dynamic busi-
ness judgment test.
141. Id. at 1215. This "allows the court to scrutinize the SLC's recommendations for
hints of subtle, perhaps even unconscious, bias." Id.
142. 430 A.2d at 789.
143. One Year Later, supra note 14, at 401.
144. The court, finding a conflict of interest, sought to impose a higher degree of scru-
tiny despite the use of an SLC. The dynamic view of the business judgment rule would
account for such heightened scrutiny. See supra text following note 49.
145. Aronoff & Freeman, supra note 8, at 30, col. 1.
146. See, e.g., Comment, Restricting the Power, supra note 16, at 1214-15.
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gaps to be filled by the "practical experience"' 4 7 of applying or
refusing to apply Zapata's principles in future cases.
III. THE PROGENY: APPLICATION OF ZP.4T CO". V
MALDONADO
Motions to terminate derivative suits continue to be used by
corporations seeking greater control over litigation involving cor-
porate claims. 4 ' Some writers have argued that the major issues
faced by the post-Zapata courts have been: (1) whether to adopt
the Zapata or the Auerbach "test" when there is no controlling
state decision; and (2) whether Zapata is applicable to demand-
refused cases involving Delaware corporations. 149 The second is-
sue is significant if the Zapata court indeed intended to create an
explicit dichotomy in its curious footnote. 50 However, it is the
first issue-the attempt to decide between allegedly different
tests-that has continued the confusion over the proper standard
for judicial scrutiny of directors' conformity with their perform-
ance obligations.
A derivative suit filed by minority shareholders, alleging
breach of fiduciary duty and violations of securities laws, forced
the federal district court in Watts v. Des Moines Register & Trib-
une' 5' to predict the status of the business judgment rule in
Iowa. 152 The court accepted the basic premise that a decision not
to pursue a derivative suit is a business decision deserving some
degree of judicial deference. 53 The Watts court also recognized
the "current trend" of extending highly deferential business judg-
ment protection to SLC decisions, represented by the Burks-
Abbey-Lewis line of cases. 154 However, after considering several
147. Payson, Goldman & Inskip, supra note 3, at 1212.
148. Aronoff & Freeman, supra note 8, at 28; see Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F.
Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982); Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. Il. 1982); Watts
v. Des Moines Register & Tribune, 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981).
149. One Year Later, supra note 14, at 403.
150. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
151. 525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981). The plaintiff alleged the violations in connec-
tion with voting trust and recapitalization plans designed to prevent takeover attempts. Id.
at 1315-17.
152. See supra text accompanying note 81 (first part of Burks test).
153. 525 F. Supp. at 1324-25.
154. Id. at 1325; see also supra notes 25 & 85 (review of state corporate statutory
schemes).
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Iowa decisions,' 55 the court concluded:
[U]pon consideration of the high standard of care to which
corporate fiduciaries are subject in Iowa and the protective atti-
tude displayed by the state's courts toward the rights of minor-
ity shareholders ... the Court is persuaded that the Iowa
Supreme Court would apply the more stringent version of the def-
erential business judgment rule expounded by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Zapata .... 156
By its language, the court demonstrated a dynamic rather than
static view of the business judgment rule.'5 7 The concerns raised
in the Watts opinion are similar to those that traditionally have
triggered heightened scrutiny of director decisionmaking. 5s The
court implicitly recognized that blind deference to board recom-
mendations of dismissal becomes increasingly less appropriate as
derivative suits focus on director malfeasance.15 9
Faced with no controlling Virginia decision, Judge Merhige of
the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia adopted the
Zapata test in Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co. 160 The court
granted the corporation's motion for summary judgment even
though it applied the more stringent judicial business judgment
prong of the Zapata test.161 Having excused demand, 162 the court
compared Virginia corporate statutes 163 with those of Dela-
ware, 'I which had been construed in Zapata. Finding the two to
155. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. One Craig Place Ltd., 303 N.W.2d 688 (Iowa 1981);
Rowen v. La Mars Mutual Ins. Co., 282 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1979).
156. 525 F. Supp. at 1325 (emphasis added) (citations ommitted).
157. See supra text following note 49.
158. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
159. Recent Development, 8 J. Cons. L. 145, 165 (1982). Even "[t]he issue of the inde-
pendence and good faith of the directors moving to dismiss, whether or not it is expressly
so stated, involves the court in some kind of inquiry as to whether the wrong claimed. . . is
substantial or insubstantial." Aronoff & Freeman, supra note 8, at 28, col.4 (emphasis
added).
160. 546 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982). The district court previously had denied Uni-
versal's motion to dismiss. See Abella v. Universal Leaf Tpbacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713
(E.D. Va. 1980) (relying heavily on "absolute right" theory of Maldonado v. Flynn, 413
A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980)). Since Zapata reversed Maldonado v. Rlynn, the court permit-
ted Universal to renew its motion to dismiss. 546 F. Supp. at 797.
161. 546 F. Supp. at 805.
162. Although the defendants raised the demand requirement as an affirmative de-
fense, none pressed this claim in the motion to dismiss. "For purposes of these motions, the
Court [accepted] plaintiffs excuse that such a demand would have been futile, since a ma-
jority of the board took part in the transactions of which he complains." Id. at 798 n.2.
Taking "considerable guidance" from Watts, id. at 799-800, the court used the excuse of
demand to satisfy the first prong of the Zapata test.
163. See VA. CODE §§ 13.1-35, -40 (1978).
164. See supra note 25.
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have substantially the same provisions, the court went on to apply
the two-step Zapata test to the facts before it.
In applying the first step, the Abella court found that the cor-
poration had carried its burden of proving the independence and
good faith of the SLC, as well as the reasonableness of its investi-
gation and basis of its conclusions. 165 Since the first step was sat-
isfied, the court chose to go to the second step, which involved
applying its own independent business judgment as to whether the
suit should proceed.' 66 At the outset of this step of the court's
analysis, Judge Merhige made clear that the exercise of judicial
business judgment is not a usurpation of director decisionmaking
power.167 Although apparently trying to limit the scope of
Zapata's second step, theAbella court effectively granted the cor-
poration summary judgment on the merits.' 68 Exercise of judicial
business judgment, according to the court, "involves only the sort
of matter in which, not immodestly, the Court has a fair degree of
expertise; it has only to conclude. . . that a suit against the Direc-
tors was destined to fail.'5169
The court's scrutiny of the directors' conformity with their per-
formance obligations was apparently quite stringent.' 70 Yet, the
court specifically limited its basis for granting summary judgment
to the fact that "plaintiff [had] not put forth evidence to support
his claim."' 17 1
Thus, the significance of the Zapata test, as well as its content,
remained generally undefined until the Second Circuit, in Joy v.
North, 172 "flushed-out" some factors that courts should consider
in exercising their independent business judgment. A divided
panel' 73 reversed the district court's dismissal of the derivative
165. 546 F. Supp. at 800-01.
166. Id.
167. "The Court's exercise of its business judgment is not to be interpreted as an inva-
sion of the right of trained business personnel to exercise their best business judgment." Id.
at 802.
168. See One Year Later, supra note 14, at 407 (Abella court fundamentally misunder-
stood its task under second step of Zapata test).
169. 546 F. Supp. at 802 (emphasis added).
170. The court's inquiry into the merits of the plaintiffs claims amounted to almost a
"mini-trial." See Aronoff & Freeman, supra note 8, at 28, col. 4; (second step of Zapata
test involves 'mini-trial' on issues in litigation).
171. 546 F. Supp. at 801-02. In fact, the plaintiffwas quite lax in conducting discovery;
at the time of the summary judgment motion he had conducted only one two-hour deposi-
tion of one defense lawyer. Id. at 802.
172. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1498 (1983).
173. Judges Oakes and Winter comprised the majority and Judge Cardamone
dissented.
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suit. Interpreting Connecticut law, the Second Circuit adopted a
standard of review similar to that of Zapata.' 4 The court recog-
nized the difficulty of scrutinizing conformity of a director's deci-
sionmaking with his performance obligations and thus sought to
"establish some guidelines" to ease that task. 175
The Joy court stressed that the guidelines only applied to situ-
ations of direct economic injury to a corporation's asset pool that
diminish the value of shareholder investments.1 76 The court ap-
plied "far more vigorous scruntiny ... than occurs under the
good faith, independence and throughness test,"' 77 since the exist-
ence of a conflict of interest is "hardly eliminated by the creation
of an [SLC]. 17 8 It thus shifted the burden to the corporation
moving for dismissal or summary judgment "to demonstrate that
the action is more likely than not to be against the interests of the
corporation." 
179
The court described the mechanics of this judicial scrutiny:
[T]he function of the court's review is to determine the balance
of probabilities as to likely future benefit to the corporation, not
to render a decision on the merits. . . . Where the court deter-
mines that the likely recoverable damages discounted by the
probability of a finding of liability are less than the costs to the
corporation in continuing the action, it should dismiss the
case. 1
80
174. Some writers have read Joy as offering a "new test." See, e.g., One Year Later,
supra note 14, at 404. Yet, no matter how the approach is described, all courts are simply
trying to find "a balancing point where bona fide stockholder power.. . cannot be un-
fairly trampled on. . .but the corporation can rid itself of detrimental litigation." Zapata
430 A.2d at 777; see supra text following note 49 (describing judicial mechanics of arriving
at "balancing point").
175. 692 F.2d at 891.
176. Id. Thus, Joy demonstrates how a court can determine whether to apply height-
ened scrutiny to director decisions. The court drew a nice distinction between "direct in-
jury" cases and those involving ultra vires or illegal acts. See supra notes 96-109 (cases
involving illegal or improper foreign payments).
177. 692 F.2d at 891.
178. Id. at 888.
179. Id. at 892. "This showing is to be based on the underlying data developed in the
course of discovery and of the committee's investigation and the committee's reasoning, not
simply its naked conclusions." Id. The weight of the evidence put forth by the SLC is to
be determined by conventional analysis, involving considerations such as whether the testi-
mony was under oath or subject to cross-examination. Id.
180. Id. The costs that may be considered in the court's review include attorney's fees
and other out-of-pocket expenses related to the litigation, as well as the time spent by
corporate personnel preparing for and participating in the trial. Id. It is noteworthy that
over 80 years ago, the Supreme Court mentioned some of these factors as allowable consid-
erations in a corporate decision whether to pursue a corporate claim. See Corbus v. Alaska
Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455 (1903) (strangely not cited in Joy).
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Scrutinizing the SLC recommendations with a dynamic analy-
sis, 18 1 the Joy court was able to deny summary judgment within
the bounds of traditional business judgment rule standards. The
court not only altered burdens of proof, but also increased the de-
gree of particularized showing necessary to sustain a motion to
dismiss.
IV. CONCLUSION
As corporations have sought to regain some measure of con-
trol over the litigation of corporate claims, courts have been
forced to develop appropriate standards to judge such corporate
actions. This Note has demonstrated that, like other business de-
cisions, a corporate decision to terminate a shareholder derivative
suit must be scrutinized within established doctrine.
The dynamic business judgment equation, which has operated
historically in this area, continues to apply to corporate acts chal-
lenged as improper or illegal.' 2 Further, this equation is directly
applicable to cases of alleged director malfeasance.'83 The judici-
ary has constantly searched for the appropriate degree of judicial
review for board decisions. As one can see in both the pre-'84 and
post-Zapata 8 decisions, the courts will closely analyze each fac-
tual nuance to establish an appropriate level at which to scrutinize
a director's conformity with his performance obligations. Courts
and commentators must recognize the dynamic nature of the busi-
ness judgment rule. Only then can a reasonable sense of coher-
ence be brought to judicial scrutiny (past and future) of board
decisions to terminate shareholder derivative suits.
JAMES B. ARONOFF
Should the Joy analysis produce a finding of likely net return "not substantial in rela-
tion to shareholder equity," 692 F.2d at 892, the court may then consider two other items as
costs: the impact of distraction of key personnel by continued litigation, and the lost profits
that might result from trial publicity. Id. at 892-93. What will amount to a "substantial"
net return will likely spark considerable debate. This part of the court's analysis is cer-
tainly favorable to the corporate movant. In large, publicly held corporations, it is difficult
to imagine a derivative suit ever being able to generate a net return that is substantial in
relation to shareholders' equity.
181. See supra text following note 49.
182. See supra notes 96-109 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 121-47 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 148-81 and accompanying text.
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